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Timely and effective decision-making is a pre-requisite for success on operations. The aim of battle procedure is to ensure that troops are given orders in sufficient time to prepare, and that they are properly briefed prior to an operation starting. Decision-making is a key part of battle procedure. On the one hand decision-making can be intuitive, whilst on the other it can be the result of detailed analysis of a problem. Where time is a significant constraint, the commander will have to rely more heavily on his intuition, and it may be that only one course of action (COA) can be developed. Where time is not as pressing a constraint, the commander will probably wish to develop several COAs. In either case, the decision-making process seeks to answer a number of simple questions which can be applied at every level of command. As the level of command gets higher and operations become more complex, so the need increases to apply tools and techniques for decision-making to ensure that plans for the application of combat power are both integrated and synchronized.

The front section of the booklet describes the overall planning process and deals with Questions 1 to 7 in turn. The back section of the booklet (the Annexes) includes additional information and expands on certain detail giving further examples where necessary.
The Combat Estimate aims to ensure that a timely, *enemy focused* and *effects based* plan is produced. It is a thought process, not a rigid series of drills and can as equally be adapted to peace support operations (PSO) as to warfighting.

Whilst it is acknowledged that higher HQs may use the Combat Estimate, this booklet is aimed at Bde/BG staff and unit/sub-unit commanders. The booklet will demonstrate what is required from each question, how it links to, or drives other processes within the Combat Estimate and what output is produced.

To what extent the tools shown in this booklet are applied will depend on the situation and time available. This is just a guide. Practice will refine your planning process. Answer the Seven Questions but use the tools selectively and creatively. *Do not just slavishly follow the process.*
To be effective, the Comd must make timely decisions and take the appropriate action. He should continually strive to decide and act faster than the enemy. The planning process must support this. The plan must be flexible enough to react to a changing enemy picture.

Time for proper battle procedure especially at the lower level of command is frequently overlooked during planning at Bde/BG HQ levels.
The less time there is, the more the Comd will have to be involved in the planning process. His guidance will be more directed and he will make greater use of his intuition.

The more time he has, the greater the opportunity for the staff to use analysis and input their skills during the process. As a result there is likely to be more use of staff tools to develop the plan.

The generation of tempo through planning is key. The Comd and his staff must properly analyse the situation, recognize decisive elements, and come up with a simple and workable solution in a timely manner.
The 7 Questions represent the fundamental issues that need to be addressed in order to produce a plan. If each question is addressed fully, planning is likely to be more thorough.

The tools and techniques are used selectively to help address the questions depending on the situation and time available.

Note:

- The planning starts by focussing on the enemy and the ground. The Comd, having conducted mission analysis, then states the effects he wants to have on the enemy. **This must be the focus for the entire planning process.**
- The use of graphical techniques and schematics is encouraged. They are an efficient way to record deductions from the analysis of the questions and with which to communicate the plan.
- Estimate products lead directly to the production of orders, as well as tools to assist the staff in the execution of the plan.
- If time is short, selective use of the tools and techniques is acceptable, **so long as each of the seven questions are addressed.**
Before planning starts, some preparation is required:

- Create or modify the **timeline matrix**. It is essential that the time available for planning is clearly worked out and displayed at the start. (See Page 7).
- Work out 1/3 - 2/3 timelines.
  - Superimpose en timelines and day and night.
  - Set deadlines and work out rostas.
  
  It is essential all staff know what their deadlines are.
- **WngOs**. It may be appropriate to issue a WngO on 3 occasions.
  - On receipt of either orders or a WngO
  - On completion of Question 3. It is useful to units/sub-units to be issued with a copy of the Comd’s Effects Schematic at this stage.
  - On selection of the COA (Comd’s decision), which should include troops to task.

Information should be drip fed to the subordinates whenever appropriate, to allow concurrent activity.

- In preparation for Mission Analysis, all relevant higher staff-work (eg DSO and matrix, op overlay/graphics) and G2 information should be available.
- All key players are present and have had time to read the OpO.

- **Displaying Information**. Too frequently information is not properly recorded and disappears into staff officers’ notebooks. Recording forms or large format boards are highly recommended to prevent information getting lost. Whatever method is employed, there must always be a tangible output from any meeting or discussion (a list, RFI, a schematic).
Key in preparation is the management of time. The COS/2IC must draw up a timeline at the start of planning to give the planning group clear guidance on how much time is available for each part of the planning process. The HQ should take no more than 1/3 of the time available prior to the first activity (ie: a move, expected arrival of the enemy or H Hour) for its planning – this includes the time required for Orders. The staff know exactly when staffing deadlines are and the time of key events like the Decision Brief to the Comd, the time of the wargame and when Orders are to be prepared by.

To manage time efficiently, the timeline should include all activity undertaken by the Bde/BG not just time for planning. The staff can then see time in the context of the whole operation. The HQ should have prepared a timeline board with day/night lines, unit/sub-unit activity, key CSS events, right up to H Hr. Include road moves, defensive position preparation, backbriefs, mission rehearsals etc.

The example shows a timeline covering both planning and the overall operation. It is not exhaustive but covers the principal areas. The timeline is the natural start of the synchronization matrix, which is covered in Question 6. The timings for Questions 4 – 7 have been merged as these questions are rarely conducted in discrete blocks. It is usual for Questions 4 – 7 to be conducted once in outline to establish the differing COA(s) and then again in more detail after the Comd has selected his COA.

The Comd’s Decision Brief can be given at any stage after Question 5 depending on the time available to fully develop a chosen COA. If the Comd has been present throughout the Comd’s Decision Brief can be used as an opportunity to give guidance and to confirm detail.

A comprehensive timeline will have benefits later on in the planning process.
MAIN HQ deals with a great deal of information during planning and execution of a mission. Most of this is routine and is not critical to the success of the operation but merely comes under the general heading of Information Requirements (IR). However Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) are those pieces of information which are CRITICAL to the Comd’s decision making – e.g. the information on which he has to base his key decisions. CCIR are therefore key to how the mission is planned and the battle is fought. The staff can recommend to the Comd during planning what they assess as critical, but he must ultimately decide what he considers critical to success. CCIRs are:

- **Priority Information Requirements (PIR).** PIR cover information on the enemy (such as where his bridges are during a river crossing operation so that they become key targets).

- **Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR)** enable the Comd to have a real handle on where the various parts of he Bde/BG are and what their status is at any stage of the battle.

- **Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).** What vital capabilities must we conceal from the enemy - our bridges or the location of the reserve?

- Staff MUST be clear on what critical information requirements the Comd is woken up for.
This first question ensures that right from the start of the planning process we are focused on the enemy. IPB is used to produce graphical intelligence products (environment and enemy) to allow the Comd to Visualise the likely effects of the battlespace on his and the enemy’s forces.

- The process normally involves:
  - Defining Battlespace/AO. (See Page 10)
  - Describing Battlespace’s/AO’s effects. (See Page 10)
  - Evaluating the Enemy. (See Page 12)
  - Describing the Enemy COA(s). (See Pages 13-15)

The process is dynamic and sensitive to change.

- **Endstate.** As a result of Question 1, the Comd must be able to picture the potential of the environment and understand the capability of the enemy how the enemy is likely to use his strengths and the ground to his advantage in time and space.

  As a result of Question 1 the Comd must know what enemy he is facing, where the enemy is and when the enemy is likely to appear.
IPB consists of 3 basic steps:

- **BAE**: Normally undertaken by the Engr. It is an assessment of the effects of the battlespace on both friendly and enemy operations. It seeks to identify likely Mobility Corridors (MC), Avenues of Approach (AA) and Manoeuvre Areas. An important part is describing the military aspects of terrain. As a checklist, we use the mnemonic OCOKA as follows:
  - **O**: Observation & Fields of Fire.
  - **C**: Cover & Concealment.
  - **O**: Obstacles.
  - **K**: Key Terrain.
  - **A**: Avenues of Approach.

- **Threat Evaluation**: Identifies the enemy’s doctrinal norms and is independent of terrain and weather. Tactical doctrine and past modus operandi inform this step. Products from Threat Evaluation might include overlays of the Order of Battle (Big to Small) and how they might be arrayed on the ground. Additionally, strengths / weaknesses in organisation or system terms (lack of AD, numerous bridging assets) should be described. The G2 should start to advise the Comd at this stage what is key to look for - his Priority Information Requirements (PIR).

- **Threat Integration**: Combines the BAE and Threat Evaluation. It aims to show how the enemy is likely to operate for real in the AO - combining environment and doctrine and applying them practically to the situation and the ground. Prior to looking at how the enemy might operate within the AO the G2 should produce his assessment of the enemy intent by way of an Enemy Effects Schematic. The Products of Threat Integration are:
  - **Enemy Effects Schematic**: In the same way the Comd articulates the effects he wishes to achieve the G2 should make a similar assessment of the en effects. (Effects Schematics are explained in more detail on page 14).
  - **The Situation Overlay**: Produced for each Enemy COA - shows the tactical deployment adapted to terrain. Overlays show where in Time and Space key events might take place.
  - **The Event Overlay**: Derived from the combined Situation overlays. It is the differences between each of the En’s assessed COAs which provide the indicators as to which COA he is adopting. This is the basis of the Intelligence Collection Plan. Initial siting of Named Areas of Interest (NAI) (deciding WHERE to look) begins as early as this and is G2 led. (See page 49 for more on NAIs).
• The BGE and the IO should consider both the AOR (the area in which the BG will operate and deploy) as well as the AOI (the area from which the enemy could influence the BG AO).

• They should analyze:
  • Restricted and Severely Restricted areas.
  • Choke Points.
  • Mobility Corridors permitting movement in single file or in attack formations from troop to battalion level.
  • Resulting in Avenues of Approach.
  • Key Terrain.
  • The effects of weather on both enemy and friendly forces. (See pages 56-58).

• See page 53 - 55 for detail on how to build BAE.
The next stage of the IPB is Threat Evaluation. Here the IO conducts analysis to determine the enemy’s capabilities and likely tactics based on his doctrinal norms. **Almost all of this step should be completed or be available prior to deployment or prior to the operation.**

The endstate is to visualize how the enemy normally executes operations, and how the actions of the past shape what they are capable of in the current situation.

**Portrayal of the enemy at this stage should include:**

- Organization and Combat Effectiveness
- Equipment
- Doctrine
- Tactics and Preparedness

In this step the IO should look to building his evaluation in three steps:

**Doctrinal Templates.** Scaled graphical depictions of threat dispositions - include frontages, depths, boundaries, engagement areas, objective depths and other control measures. (See page 59/60).

**Description of Tactics.** Examine the operations of the major units. Include the major “shapers” and their role in the operation. Include a description to ensure that it is more than a snapshot in time. (See page 61).

**Identification of High Value Targets.** Targets that are essential for the success of the enemy commander’s mission. For further description of HVT/HPT/Targeting see page 66.

**Definition** - Threat Integration is the identification and development of likely enemy COAs that will influence the friendly operation.

**Endstate** - Identify those areas and activities that, when observed, will indicate (Event Overlay) which COA the enemy commander has chosen.
Effect | Purpose
--- | ---
FIND | Confirm en locs in the 4 effects
SEIZE & DECEIVE | Crossings over the river and DECEIVE en as to which crossing
DISRUPT | En ISTAR assets
DEFEAT | Strike to DEFEAT en objective
SECURE | The high ground to south of AO
BLOCK | BPT counter any counter-attack

The IO should outline the enemy intent by way of an enemy Effects Schematic and brief it as part of the Q1 brief.
Situation Overlays are simply, **views of an enemy COA**. It shows the doctrinal template as it might move and fight through your AO in time and space. Its purpose is to provide the Comd with a clear view of where and when the enemy might appear and what he might do. It helps the Comd to think about his strategy or “battle-winning idea”. Without this clear view of the enemy it becomes much more difficult for him to conceptualize his own plan and therefore give guidance to his staff.

- Enemy COA (Situation Overlays) should meet the following criteria:
  - **Suitable** - To accomplish the Enemy Mission
  - **Feasible** - The Enemy COA must have the capability to accomplish the mission in terms of Time, Space & Resources.
  - **Acceptable** - The advantage gained by executing this Enemy COA must justify the cost in terms of resources.
    - **And most important**
      - **Distinguishable** - Each Enemy COA must differ significantly from the others

**Note:**
- The enemy's **most likely COA** will be the COA which gives the enemy the most consistent superiority with the least amount of risk and most closely matches his doctrine.
- The **most dangerous COA** will be the COA with the most decisive superiority at the critical time but which for the enemy, is a high risk option.

See pages 63-64 for more on Situation Overlays
Sets out graphically when and where key tactical events might be expected to take place. The Event Overlay should identify NAIs that will confirm which COA the enemy may be adopting.

An Event Overlay is a consolidation of all the Situation Overlays (En COAs) to identify where similarities and differences occur. Its purpose is to identify through deductive reasoning which COA the enemy is using.

Comparison of the different enemy COA will demonstrate where COAs are similar and where they are different.

If we resource our Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP) in those areas where enemy COAs are common, we will identify activity, but it will be impossible to confirm or deny which COA the enemy is adopting. Therefore it is imperative to target those areas where differences occur. It is here where we should place our limited assets to get the best value from them.

See Page 65 for more on Event Overlays.
The above checklist is useful for G2s, to form the basis of their Q1 brief to the Comd. It pieces together all the output from Q1.

At this stage the G2 and staff will not have a complete picture. The G2 will have to make an assessment using his experience and logical analysis. The BG Comd is likely to be the most experienced in assessing the enemy and must therefore give guidance as appropriate. What the G2 misses at this stage he is likely to get from RFIs and once battle commences. “Good enough now is better than perfect too late!” The G2 must state when his assessment is as a result of confirmed information, detailed analysis or ‘best guess’. The Comd can then direct him where to expend his effort in developing the G2 picture.
Question 2

What have I been told to do and why?

Mission Analysis

There is no change to the mission analysis you have always used.

Note:

- Do not be afraid to seek clarification of your mission.
- Gaining input from all cells in the HQ will ensure all tasks are teased out.
- Record the deductions from the process.
- If time is short this will be done intuitively (as in contact situations)
- Msn Analysis should/could be done separately by the Comd and his principle staff officers. They then come together with the Comd going over his key deductions first, then allowing the staff to present their deductions/findings to him. In this way, they hopefully cover all the deductions from specified and implied tasks.
- Specified Tasks can be found in some or all of the following: Mission statement, Coord Instrs (Provide LO etc..), DSO - NAI/TAIs allocated to a Bde/BG, Int Collection Plan, CSSO (estb PW cage etc.,)
Completing the above sheet ensures that all the detail and deductions from mission analysis are recorded.

The CCIRs and RFIs that fall out from the commander’s mission analysis are normally the most critical to both the planning and execution of the mission. It is likely that a separate RFI board will be required.

CCIRs form the ‘golden thread’ and ideally should be linked to DPs, if no obvious link is identified there relevance should be questioned. See page 50.
This is when the Comd identifies and articulates the effects he wishes to have on the enemy.

By now the Comd has:

- Been briefed on the ground and enemy and given further direction to the G2 where necessary;
- Answered Question 2 - his Mission Analysis.

The Comd now has a good feel for the battlespace and how the enemy might operate in order to achieve its aims, as well as a clear understanding of what the Bde/BG is being asked to achieve. He must now formulate an outline of the effects to be achieved by the Bde/BG to both counter the enemy and to achieve the Bde/BG mission.
The Comd must now decide what effects he wishes to have on the enemy and why. By applying his experience and intuition he should describe the effects to be achieved (in the form of an Effects Schematic) as well as the purpose for each effect. If possible the commander should stipulate what effect is likely to be his Main Effort and the End State.

He should also give additional direction to focus the staff planning effort. Suggested methods include the use of applicable Functions in Combat, principles of war or principles of the operation. CCIRs may also be emphasized at this stage.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FIND IOT</td>
<td>Confirm/discount enemy routes, strengths enemy COAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TURN IOT</td>
<td>Channel enemy into ground of my choosing into Bde/BG EA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLOCK IOT</td>
<td>Prevent enemy penetration/infiltration to the NE of Bde/BG AO and away from the Div/Bde No Penetration line. <strong>This is the Bde/BG ME.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFEAT IOT</td>
<td>Strike to destroy enemy 1st tac echelon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURPRISE DECEPTION IOT</td>
<td>Surprise and deception must be included in development &amp; of the plan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. There are effects for both Kinetic and non-kinetic actions on the enemy and inanimate objects. Definitions of military effects are given on pages 71 and 72.
Prior to drawing his Effects Schematic and preparing his direction the Comd should take ‘time out’ to gather his thoughts. Following his direction, the staff must be clear as to:

- The effects to be achieved.
- The guidance given to them (must include a ME and may include the Battle Winning Idea) (Note 1).
- End State.
- When he wishes to receive an update/decision brief.
- What assessment criteria is to be used for the Decision Brief.

Once the Comd has issued his direction, the staff can issue WngO 2. It is useful to issue the Effects Schematic to sub unit Comds at this stage.

Comds guidance on own COA(s) during Question 3 is an area that has caused confusion and is addressed on the next slide.

Note:

1. The Battle Winning Idea is defined as, ‘that battlefield activity or technique which would most directly accomplish the mission.’
Comds Guidance on COAs at Question 3

The completion of Question 4 and 5 by the staff will lead to the identification of COA(s).

However:

- The Comd may direct a single COA by placing effects onto the ground and resourcing them himself.
- The Comd may choose to give guidance by:
  - Placing certain effects on the ground or directing options for the positioning of effects.
  - Providing options for resourcing certain effects.
  - Sequencing.

Comds guidance on COAs. This is an area that has caused confusion. It is recommended that Question 4 and 5 are answered first as this allows COAs to naturally develop as part of the estimate. It should be noted that if options are addressed as they arise the estimate may filter the options into one COA.

Although not mandated, the Comd may wish to give guidance as to the potential COA(s) he wishes to see developed. If he wishes to be utterly prescriptive (ie when time is short), he may place the effects directly on the map and allocate resources to them. However, he may wish just to highlight options for some of the effects,

‘I see the block effect either taking place forward of the river or in the area of the high ground to the rear of our AO.’

Or he may choose to give direction on how he sees a particular effect being resourced,

‘I would like you to examine the possibility of using the armoured squadron in the Block or as part of the Delay effect.’
Staff often find difficulty in developing the direction they have received in Question 3 into the COA(s) and then into a plan. The key to success is to focus on Questions 4 and 5 and answer them fully.

The Comd gives direction on what effects he wishes to have on the enemy with the production of his Effects Schematic (Question 3). This is then put onto a map and NAI(s), TAI(s) and possibly DPs allocated (Question 4). Each effect is then resourced to achieve the desired effect (Question 5). Questions 4 and 5 can be completed either sequentially or simultaneously. Alternative COAs are then developed in a number of ways, for instance:

- By identifying differing places on the ground where the effects can be achieved (this will lead to a separate Draft DSO for each combination)
- By identifying differing methods and resources by which an effect can be achieved (this will lead to separate DSOM).
- Sequencing.
The staff should refrain from focussing on potential COAs until they have completed the tasks to the best of their ability. By answering correctly Questions 4 and 5, potential COAs will become apparent along with their relative strengths and weaknesses and associated DPs and potential CONPLANs. COA(s) can then be developed by answering elements of Questions 6 and 7.

The Comd may choose to be back briefed at any stage during the process. By making a series of decisions as and when issues arise, the Combat Estimate can be used in a similar fashion to a funnel, absorbing new detail in order to produce an outline plan. Exactly when a Comd is back briefed will depend on his personal preferences and on the capabilities of his staff. As a start point it is recommended that the Comd is back briefed after Questions 4 and 5 and elements of Questions 6 and 7 have been answered. This will allow the Comd to analyse the options available to him and to direct/select the COA he requires to be worked up.
In Question 4, the staff now use their experience and the products from Questions 1-3 to identify where best to site the effect if the Comd has not stipulated this already.

Some effects will be strictly dictated by the ground – ie for the FIND effect. Other effects could be possible in a number of locations – ie a STRIKE or DEFEAT effect. This in itself will offer differing options and potentially lead to one or more draft DSOs.
The 'WHERE' is applying the Effect Schematic in more detail to the map, placing NAIs and TAIs where best to apply the effect.

This has already been started in Question 1 with the construction of the Event Overlay and the identification of initial NAIs to confirm/deny enemy COAs.

As stated earlier Question 4 can be answered before Question 5 or both can be tackled simultaneously – one effect at a time.
**Step 1**: This should include any specialists and attached arms. The Comd must decide if his Arty and Engr advisor would be more useful to the development of the plan or conducting recces with him.

**Step 2**:  
- BAE will inform where not to go and where manoeuvre is possible.  
- Higher formation Ops Trace will give boundaries and EAs.  
- Higher formation DSO will accurately display NAIs/TAIs allocated to the Bde.  
- En COA/Event Overlay will show where NAIs/TAIs should be placed – a comparison can then be made with the en Most Dangerous COA to ensure there are NAIs to cover this.

**Step 3**: The Comd's Effects Schematic should be repeatedly applied to the DSO to ensure that as the DSO is developing it complies with his overall intent.

**Step 4**: Once all the overlays have been applied to the DSO a complete list of NAIs, TAIs and DPs will cover the DSO. These will have to be refined and adequately resourced during Question 5.

**Step 5**: Ready for Question 5.
At the end of Question 4 the basic draft DSO is likely to look like this; with NAIIs and DPs linked to TAIIs positioned on the ground to conform with the Comd’s Effects Schematic.

What is cfm’d
In NAI 1 will be decided on at DP1 and struck in TAI 1
If the Comd has not given specific direction as to how he wishes to resource an effect then the COS/2IC should now make these decisions for each COA allocating troops to task. It must be emphasized however, that it is imperative that this stage of the planning is truly an all arms activity to ensure that the differing methods, by arm or service, of achieving an effect are considered and the relevant advice is available to the COS/2IC. In addition, each effect (NAI and TAI) must be fully resourced according to the enemy threat and utilizing the full capabilities of the ORBAT. This is likely to result in over committing the Bde/BG and will therefore lead to the need to synchronize activity in Question 6.

It is also vital that the G2 is present at this stage to provide advice on the likely enemy threat within specified effects boxes at varying stages in the battle. This will then enable the COS/2IC to counter this threat with sufficient combat power.
Question 5 – NAI/TAI Resourcing

- What enemy am I likely to see in the particular NAI/TAI, what is his likely mission and what combat power does he have available to him?
  - From Q1 (Most Likely En COA usually but may include branches from the En Most Dangerous COA)

- What resources (combat power) do I need to counter the enemy and therefore achieve the Comd’s desired effect identified in Q3?

The consideration of the type, size and strength of an enemy entering a NAI or TAI will indicate the friendly force type and strength required to either identify (for NAI) or counter (for TAI) that enemy in the effects box (Relative Strengths). Wargaming techniques may be useful in helping to answer this question as comprehensively as possible.

NAIs and TAIs must be resourced according to the effect required by the Comd set against the likely enemy deployed against it. NAIs and TAIs should be fully resourced to achieve the effect without undue consideration to the realities of the ORBAT. The detail is then entered onto a DSOM or similar document that can be compared to the ORBAT to highlight shortfalls. This will provide different COAs to brief the Comd and the synchronisation of available resources to achieve the required effect is central to answering Question 6. Again this must be an all arms consideration to ensure the correct Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (CAOI).

Some of the NAIs will have already been partly resourced in Question 1, (possibly to get Bde/BG recce deployed early), others will evolve following Question 3. This detail is then entered onto a Decision Support Overlay Matrix. ie allocating troops to task in order to keep a record of what elements of the Bde/BG have been used.
Using the DSO the differing methods by which the effect might be achieved have been listed see above (obviously utilising only those forces available on the Bde/BG Task Org).

The ‘TURN’ effect might be achieved by: use of an obstacle belt, deploying armour into a block position, putting an infantry unit into a defensive position or by channelling the enemy by engaging him with artillery. 4 means to achieve the one effect.

Next is the ‘BLOCK’ effect which has 3 methods listed and the ‘DEFEAT’ effect with 4 methods listed. By selecting a different method of resourcing each effect different COAs will potentially fall out. ie 3 different COAs might be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EFFECT: Method 1: (COA 1)</th>
<th>TURN</th>
<th>BLOCK</th>
<th>DEFEAT</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obs belt</td>
<td>Inf def</td>
<td>Armd strike</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method 2: (COA 2)</th>
<th>Armd block</th>
<th>Inf def</th>
<th>Avn strike</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method 3: (COA 3)</th>
<th>Inf def</th>
<th>Inf def</th>
<th>Armd strike</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
The differing COAs will often be dictated by the troops available to carry out the tasks – rarely will there be sufficient to conduct the operation simultaneously and they will therefore have to be employed sequentially – synchronized in Question 6.

A variety of methods are available for resourcing the COAs:

• **ME Method.** Start with the ME *(the most common method)*, resource it fully then populate the remainder of the effects with what is left of the task org. eg if you have decided to conduct the defeat (the Comd’s ME) with your armd squadron then the block and turn will have to be done by other means: inf def, obs belt and arty.

• **Linear Method.** Start with the effects nearest to the enemy. ie in this example; turn followed by the block followed by the defeat. The minor disadvantage with this method is that you may run out of resources to conduct the defeat (the ME) if you have over populated/gold plated the shaping effects first. If this is the case then troops may have to be double hatted leading to the need to conduct a sequential operation and hence the need for synchronization.

• **Geographical Method.** If the geography of the AO permits, it may be that an effect can be achieved in a number of different locations with the same end result on the enemy, but using similar resources in the differing locations – these will also give you differing COAs.
The detail for each NAI, TAI and DP is then recorded on a DSO Matrix (DSOM). For a more detailed example see page 81.

Once the Comd has made his decision on how each NAI and TAI is to be resourced, the DSOM, an example of which is shown here, can be finalised.

**Note.** Some Bdes/BGs will produce their DPs on a one page DSM, (an example is given on Page 84), rather than on the DSOM which can be referred to during execution.
Once the DSO has been resourced and if the Comd is available, further direction can now be given, prior to the synchronisation of the COA(s). This is the first occasion that the Comd might receive a COA brief and discount other options, albeit detailed synchronisation has not yet been conducted.

The resourcing of the effects in TAIs will inform the HPT (High Payoff Targets), similarly for ISTAR and CAOI (Combined Arms Obstacle Integration).
COA briefs should include an outline sketch of the plan, so that the commander can visualize what the staff are briefing – this can be done either on a sketch or directly onto the map.

The scheme of manoeuvre and troops to task should be included as well as the ME and then the COAs compared for advantages and disadvantages.

Commanders will have their own criteria for assessing which is the best COA and they should ensure their staff understand these. Differing criteria might be:

- **Functions in Combat/ Principles of the Operation** (these can be marked out of 10 or those areas deemed critical by the commander given a heavier weighting)
- **SWOT**: Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats.
- **RTR**: Risk, Time, Resources
- or a variety of criteria such as: Feasibility, Casualties, Media Impact, Local Reactions, Acceptability, Non Lethal Effects etc.,
- Commander’s Decision Brief Bullets for each COA:
  - Scheme of manoeuvre/task org
  - Advantages/Disadvantages
  - Key points
- The staff should end with recommending a COA explaining why

For an example of a single COA proforma see page 80.
As the plan is developed, the synchronization of all arms within each TAI needs to be recorded. However, the overall synchronization is recorded on a synchronization matrix which can be further developed during wargaming.
The Decision Support Matrix (DSM) is likely to be compiled in draft before the wargame. It is different from the Decision Support Overlay Matrix (DSOM), which is a resourcing tool for Q5.

From the example we can see that the DSM lists the DP, the location of the DP, the criteria to be evaluated at the point of the decision, the actions to occur at the DP and who is responsible.

When time is short this document can act as a stand alone product. It is easy to produce and simple to understand (especially if there is a sketch to accompany the DP).

The FFIR row is crucial as they reflect the most critical pieces of information that the Comd must consider before he can make an informed decision. Most importantly these pre-conditions serve as a method to synchronize a decision.

The DSM has relevance during Planning, Preparation and Execution:

- **Planning** - Allows the Commander and his staff to visualize the conditions that need to be set to successfully execute a decision
- **Preparation** - It can be used at rehearsals to see how far critical preparation has proceeded and to clarify in the team’s mind what needs to be done.
- **Execution** - It provides the “roadmap” that everyone is on.

An example DSM is at page 84.
Prior to completing this matrix it is essential that there is a clearly understood SoM. Without this, the matrix is filled in without direction and the staff will almost certainly move into the wargame lacking a refined COA. Instead of refining the plan the wargame is used to re-develop the COA to define the SoM.

Here is an example of what one might look like. The chart in the bottom half includes time, the enemy COA and own COA and the standard functions in combat developed as required. Having assessed the enemy COA against the time scale you can then fill in the activities that you would see taking place against the various elements of the bde (manoeuvre units, fire sp assets, Engr, CSS etc).

It acts as another tool from which to fight the battle. Often it is this and a DSM that the Comd will keep to hand in the execution of a mission.
The final question to complete the detail required for the plan prior to its issue to the Bde/BG is what control measures are needed. Measures will be identified throughout the planning process but need to be finished at this stage. E.g. NAIs developed in Question 1 and refined in Question 4 may require NFAs to be allocated. These will be recorded at the time so by this stage there should be a deal of control measures already allocated or at least identified.
Control Measures

Battlespace Management (BM)

- Control Measures are frequently overlooked. They are the means by which the Comd and his staff coordinate and control what is going on in the Bde/BG AO. Answering this question will continue throughout the planning but needs to have been addressed in sufficient detail before the wargame and then refined during it. The op graphics on the map constitute a major source of control measures. They might include:

  - **Battlespace Management and Battlespace Spectrum Management.**
  - Report lines/Phase Lines/Nicknumbers.
  - Routes, Contact and Coord points.
  - Assembly and Engagement Areas and Limits of Exploitation (LoE).
  - Fire Support Co-ordination Measures (FSCM including Fire Support Safety Lines (FSSM), Fire Support Co-ordination Lines (FSCL), Restricted Fire Areas (RFA) and No Fire Areas (NFA)).
  - Bdrys, NAls, TAI and DPs/DLs.

Others include:

- ROE.
- OPSEC.
- CBRN measures.
- EMCON and COMSEC Measures.

Combat Identification (CID) measures are increasingly important to reduce the risk of fratricide. These need very careful consideration. While some will be specific to the Bde/BG, others will need co-ordination at Higher HQ level or above.
Much of the staff effort that has gone into the products in Questions 1-7 can now translate directly into the operational graphics for distribution.
The Ops trace will already comprise the Bde/BG boundaries and any control measures already imposed by Higher HQs. The Bde/BG control measures will fall naturally from the Bde/BG DSO.
Once the draft DSO, DSOM, DSM and Synch Matrix have been produced the staff are in a position to wargame and refine the plan. At Bde/BG level a minimum of 1 hour should be allocated to wargame the Comd’s chosen COA. If the staff have the time to wargame each COA prior to a Comd’s Decision Brief, then a minimum of 25 minutes per COA is recommended.

Note:
The Wargame is not a Mission Rehearsal, nor is it a substitute for a Mission Rehearsal.

If the preceding steps are not conducted fully and the staff have not produced a clear, well-defined COA with a SoM, then the wargame will simply become an extension of COA development. If this is the case then Bde/BG HQ will be pushed to adhere to the 1/3 – 2/3 rule and orders will invariably be given late.

Wargaming benefits are:

• In a sequential or chronological manner you can visualize, test and refine what you are facing.
• It involves all key members of the staff and revises them all on the plan.
• It will show the impact of the enemy on the plan thus far.
• The effect of the Friendly COAs and the enemy’s response.
• It serves to identify any gaps or shortcomings (CONPLANS).
• It is particularly useful for completing the synchronization of the all arms battle. Although the synchronization of actions within each TAI will have been worked out in detail, the overall synchronization of the plan may not be completed until the end of wargaming.
Wargame

The Wargame is a step by step process of action, reaction and counter-action for visualizing the execution of each friendly COA in relation to enemy COAs. It identifies contingencies and extensions to the primary plan, resulting in a refined plan and decision points for crucial actions.

Output:
– Refines the Task Org
– Refines the Synchronization Matrix
– Anticipates CONPLANs
– Refine and identify Decision Points
– Refine and Identify Control Measures

This slide outlines the purpose of the wargame and the major outputs.

If time is not critical a number of the COAs can be wargamed. Normally only one COA is wargamed after the commander’s decision brief.

The ‘ringmaster’ – normally the COS/2IC – must maintain the discipline and importantly the timings of the wargame.
The wargame is the final element of planning prior to production of and preparation for orders.

**Orders.** As a guideline orders preparation and issue at Bde/BG level should take the following time:

- Preparation of orders (ongoing and updated throughout the planning process) with a final 30 minutes after the wargame.
- Reproduction of orders (photocopier 40 minutes/traces 60 minutes)
- Orders rehearsal (if required) 20 minutes
- Bde/BG Comd’s Orders – 60 minutes with questions. The Bde/BG Comd should try and avoid detailed discussions affecting the entire Bde/BG with unit/sub-unit comds after orders have ended – as the remainder of the O Group will have dispersed and will rarely be privvy to these conversations.

**Backbriefs.** Comds should always attempt to hear a backbrief from their subordinates prior to the op commencing – although this is not always possible in fast moving operations. Backbriefs should be brief and cover the salient points only. Do not repeat missions and what the Comd already knows. They should cover:

- **Bde/BG input.** G2 Update, Eqpt State SITREP and end after unit/sub unit briefs with points of confirmation.
- **Unit/Sub-Unit input.** Identifying any additional implied tasks (1 min); Main deductions from unit/sub-unit comd’s Mission Analysis (4 min); Unit/Sub-unit SoM (4 min); Any key concerns or calls for reserve (1 min).

If time allows the Bde/BG should conduct a Mission Rehearsal, but it may be that the backbriefs will suffice.
Glossary of Terms
• **Named Areas of Interest (NAIs).** In order to confirm or deny the enemy’s or your own COA, the enemy must be found using the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets available, such as Fmn or Close Recce, Snipers, MSTAR, TI (MIRA or CR2) etc. To target and focus the ISTAR assets in the Bde/BG, they are tasked with watching/clearing NAIs. You may be tasked with covering higher fmn NAIs within your AO. There are three types: **Point, Area and Linear.** These will facilitate the FIND function.

• **Target Areas of Interest (TAIs).** TAIs are areas in which the Comd intends to have an effect on the enemy and act as foci for planning. Examples of such effects are **DISRUPT, FIX, TURN, BLOCK** and **DEFEAT.** They should be shaped to the ground and named or numbered and should involve CAOI planning.

• **Decision Points (DPs) and Decision Lines (DLs).** Points or lines which indicate to the Comd that a pre-planned tactical decision is required. However you may have a conceptual DP such as a sub unit’s combat effectiveness that acts as a trigger. When dealing with Bde and higher HQs you should adhere to their numbering policy for NAIs/TAIs unless they are content to change their traces to include any BG nicknumbers or nicknames. At BG level it is far easier to refer to NAIs/TAIs with Nicknames.
The slide above shows examples of PIR, how they translate into Specific Information Requirements (SIR), and how they link to the WHERE (NAIs) and its relationship to the DP.

Decision Points (DPs) are critical to mission accomplishment. They should be planned by the COS/2IC and agreed by the -Comd.

A crucial part of the DP development is the linkage they have to what it is the Comd wishes to find (PIR) and what it is that the observers have been tasked to look for (SIR) and where you are likely to find it (NAIs).

It is this linkage that drives the ISTAR plan and has it’s roots in Q1, but is subject to the running estimate.
Q1 - Annex
• Defence has been chosen in this example because it is applicable to all, from Light Role bns to Armd Bdes. However, equal if not greater weight should be given to practicing offensive ops.

• The initial enemy situation is given here. Within the next 48 hrs we expect a combined arms brigade to attack from the west to seize high ground to the south of Hastings so that a follow-up brigade, can exploit to the east.
The example above of BAE is deliberately simple for presentational purposes. It shows the water features (in blue), the going (restricted & severely restricted terrain - hashed) and the Key Terrain (circled letter K).

There is scope for a more detailed analysis and features such as the marsh lands to the NE of the map, are likely to be designated as restricted terrain. Dependent on the type of BG specific analysis may have to be conducted. eg. for a BG that is unable to deploy off road then more emphasis will be paid to routes and roads. Heavier BGs will have to be aware of road and bridge classifications.

The Engr is normally responsible for the BAE.
From the going trace the G2 assesses the en Mobility Corridors at various levels of comd as well as by type of movement – wheels on road – tracks cross country in attack formations. By examining these criteria he will build up a picture of where the en can manoeuvre against in what strength and where he is restricted.
The Mobility Corridors are merged to give more general Avenues of Approach (AA). AA will have a different picture if the unit is facing a dismounted enemy as opposed to a mounted unit.

AA fall out of analysis of Mobility Corridors, which are consolidated to produce the AA Overlay.

In the above example there are a number of Avenues of Approach depending on where the En are at a particular time but are generally funnelled into one route.
• Determine what are the Commanders Information Requirements?

• A guide might be:
  • Factual information, concerning:
    • Temperature - Highs & Lows.
    • Cloud Ceiling (Flight envelopes).
    • Visibility (Flight envelopes and STAP effects).
    • Wind Speed & Direction (OS & CBRN [Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear] Effects).
    • Light (First Light/ Last Light, NVG Windows)
  • Weather Effects on Friendly & Enemy Actions.
    • Consider if the Effects are:
      • Unfavourable
      • Marginal
      • Favourable
    • In this step the G2 or Engr is being asked to analyse the conditions to describe meaningful deductions.
• An example chart to show the kind of weather data that is required by BG users:
  
  • Wind Speed & Direction - CBRN/Smoke effects.
  
  • High & Low Temperatures - CBRN Validity Times & degradation effects on personnel and equipment (Cold & Heat) and therefore when an attack is more likely.
  
  • Cloud Ceiling - Rotary and Fixed Wing Impact. Fly/No Fly.
  
  • Visibility - STA platforms. When to order a change to STAP.
  
  • Light Data - Periods of darkness & Light. Moon set, Sun rise, Moon rise & Sun Set.
  
  • Illum - NVG (Night Vision Goggles) Windows.
• We tend to overlook the effects of weather on operations until too late. The staff must make useful deductions from the effects of weather - “What are the real effects likely to be on operations?”.  
• In this example, the Engr has thought about the advantages and disadvantages that weather effects might have on friendly and enemy operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weather Effects - Example Analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEATHER EFFECTS ON FRIENDLY ACTIVITY:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mist and bad visibility before 2200hrs will restrict use of II/TI systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Low light levels (&lt;2 Milli-lux) before 2200hrs will support air insertion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased detection, recognition &amp; ident ranges for TI after 2200hrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Low light levels will slow/hamper infiltration on the ground.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• High winds until 1800hrs will restrict use of UAVs/Avn and employment of MSTAR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEATHER EFFECTS ON ENEMY ACTIVITY:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Wind direction supports use of chemical weapons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Low ceilings will hamper employment of enemy AH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Big changes in barometric pressure likely to affect accuracy of enemy arty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Short days, long nights combined with low illum levels and late Moon Rise will result in decreased engineer effort.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The start point for threat evaluation and the assessment of capability is the analysis of the enemy’s Order of Battle (OOB).

The above example shows the structure of an Armd Bde – Note the G2’s notes in the text box (upper left).
• The organisational charts lead into this picture.

• The example shows doctrinal laydown of the en Corps zooming in on 14 Armd Bde. The notes on the slide highlight the points to be made during briefing (this narrative keeps the picture more than just a “snapshot” in time). Such notes might include:
  • Dispositions.
  • Overall intent.
  • Task and purpose of each formation.

• Use a logical sequence to brief and keep it the same every time. By doing so you will convey the information in a structured form and it will allow your listeners to follow your delivery better.

• The blue box highlights the formation of direct interest to your unit.
This chart advances the Threat Evaluation from an understanding of capability into an understanding of the enemy's potential.

The above picture is often referred to as the doctrinal overlay.
This slide shows an example of a Situation Overlay. It shows what the G2 thinks is the enemy COA if he approaches from the West (see page 55).

Note that the G2 has arrayed the constituent parts of the Armd Bde as he believes they will fight through this approach. Note also the inclusion of Time/Phase Lines.
This slide shows an example of a Situation Overlay. It shows what the G2 thinks is the enemy COA if he approaches from the South (see page 55).

The points of note highlighted on the previous page remain valid for this page.
This slide shows an example of a Situation Overlay. It shows what the G2 thinks is the enemy COA if he approaches from the East (see page 55).

The points of note highlighted on the previous pages remain valid for this page.
The placement of NAIs on the Event Overlay are explained on the Event Overlay Matrix in the above diagram.

The notes highlight which NAIs are Confirming or denying which enemy COAs, and what indicators are likely to signify these COAs.
The above definitions are useful for those involved in the targeting process. They set the start point for the Targeting process.
Q2 - Annex
An example Mission Statement is highlighted above. It will often/should include:

- The type of operation (defend)
- A number of tasks
- A unifying purpose

Unit/Sub unit mission statements do not necessarily all have to have the same unifying purpose as the Bde/BG mission, indeed none of them may have the same; but the sum of their missions and purpose must add up to their Bde/BG mission. eg:

- ISTAR Gp Msn: To identify and track the lead battalion of 14 Armd Bde iot permit the BG to destroy it in EA RAT
- A Coy Msn: Defend to block the lead en battalion crossing Line LEOPARD iot allow the BG strike into EA RAT
- A Sqn Msn: Strike to defeat the lead battalion in EA RAT iot turn the follow on bns into EA BANTAM

- The sum of these missions conforms to the BG mission given by Bde HQs
Q3 - Annex
Listed above are a series of effects terms which may be useful when considering both Effects Schematics as well as mission statements. A complete list of military effects definitions are on the following pages.
GLOSSARY OF EFFECTS TERMS

**BLOCK**
A defensive position so sited as to deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent his advance in a given direction.

**CAPTURE/SEIZE**
To capture or to take possession of an area, with or without force. It frequently involves movement during a preliminary phase.

**COUNTER-ATTACK**
Attack by part or all of a def force for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off or destroying en advance units, and with the general objective of denying to the en the attainment of his purpose in attacking.

**COVER**
Protect by offence, defence, or threat of either or both.

**CROSS**
Deliberate or hasty: cross inland water obstacle.

**CULMINATING POINT**
When the current situation can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage

**DECEIVE**
Mislead the en by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.

**DEFEAT**
To diminish the effectiveness of the en to the extent that he is unable to participate further in the battle or at least cannot fulfil his intention.

**DEFEND**
To defeat or deter a threat to provide circumstances or offensive action. Depending on what size of fmn/unit is def, def can include delay, hold, deny and attk.

**DELAY**
Op in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down en’s momentum and inflicting max damage, without in principle, becoming decisively engaged.

**DEMONSTRATE**
Attk or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the en. To distract the en’s attention without seeking contact.

**DENY**
To prevent action by blocking, disruption, dislocation and / or fire. Ground can be denied either by holding it or covering the area by dir or indir fire. To deny without holding requires surveillance.

**DEPLOY**
Mov forces within areas of op; posn forces into a fmn for battle; relocate force to desired areas of ops.

**DESTROY**
To kill or so damage an enemy force that it is rendered useless.

**DETECT**
Discover by any means the presence of a person, object or phenomenon of potential mil significance.

**DETER**
Convince a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains.

**DISENGAGE**
Break contact with the en in a delay or withdrawal.

**DISLOCATE**
To deny the enemy the ability to bring his strength to bear.

**DISRUPT**
Break apart an en fmn and its tempo; to rupture the integrity of an en’s capability.

**DIVERT**
Draw the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal op.

**ENCIRCLE**
Surround and isolate from lines of comms resulting in loss of freedom of manoeuvre.

**END-STATE**
State of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of the campaign to either terminate or resolve the conflict on favourable terms.

**ENVELOP**
Pass around or over the en’s principal def posns to secure objectives to the en’s rear.

**ESCORT**
Accompany and protect another force or convoy.

**EXFILTRATE**
Wdr as indivs, small groups or units over, through or around en posns while attempting to avoid contact.

**EXPLOIT**
Take full advantage of success in battle and follow up initial gains; follow up a successful attk to disorganise the en in depth.

**EXTRACT**
Recover reconnaissance, stay-behind or encircled forces out of contact with the en.

**FEINT**
Distract the en through seeking contact but avoiding decisive engagement by the bulk of own forces.

**FIND**
(Core function to) locate, identify and/or assess the en.

**FIX**
To deny the enemy his goals, to distract him and thus deprive him of freedom of action in order to gain own forces freedom of action.

**GUARD**
To protect a force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting info.

**HAND-OVER**
Pass responsibility for the conduct of combat op from one force to another.

**HARASS**
Fire designed to disturb the rest of en troops, to curtain mov and, by threat of losses, lower morale.

**HOLD**
To maintain or retain possession by force, of a posn or area. In an attk, to exert pressure to prevent mov or redispson of en forces.

**IDENTIFY**
Determine by any act or means the friendly or hostile nature of a detected person or object phenomenon.

**INFLTRATE**
Mov as individuals or small gps over, through or around en posns without detection.

**INSERT**
Deploy reconnaissance or stay-behind forces out of contact with the enemy.

**INTERCEPT**
Search for and listen to and / or record communications and / or electronic transmissions for the purpose of obtaining intelligence.

**INTERDICT**
Divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the en’s mil potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces; or fire placed in an area or point to prevent the en using it.

**LIAISON**
Maint contact or intercommunication between elements of mil forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purposes.

**LINK-UP**
Establishment of contact, in en controlled territory, between 2 or more friendly units or fmnns which have the same or different missions.

**MAINT**
Take supply and repair action to keep a force in condition to carry out a mission.

**MANOEUVRE**
Employ forces on the battlefield (using) mov in combination with fire or fire potential to achieve a posn of advantage in respect to the en in order to accomplish the mission.
### GLOSSARY OF EFFECTS TERMS

**MASK**
- Fire to obscure en observation.

**NEUTRALIZE**
- Fire which is delivered to hamper and interrupt mov and the firing of weapons.

**OCCUPY**
- Mov into and proper organization of an area to be used as a battle posn.

**PASSAGEOF LINES**
- Mov forward or rearwards through another force’s combat posns with the intention of moving into or out or contact with the en.

**PENETRATE**
- Break through the en’s defence and disrupt his defensive system.

**PURSUE**
- Catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it.

**RECONSTITUTE**
- Expand force structures and infrastructure beyond existing levels, incl the raising of new units and fmns and the expansion of industrial capacity to support the procurement of eqpt and stocks.

**REHABILITATE**
- Process, usually in relatively quiet area, of units and individuals recently withdrawn from combat or arduous duty, during which units recondition eqpt and are rested, furnished special facilities, filled with replacements, issued replacement supplies and eqpt, given training, and generally made ready for employment in further ops.

**REINFORCE**
- Supplement in place forces.

**RELIEVE**
- Replace all or part of a unit in an area.

**RESUPPLY**
- Maint required levels of supply.

**RETIRED**
- To mov away from the en when out of contact.

**SCOUT**
- Task of actively seeking info on the en, ground and other relevant detail in support of the comd’s plan

**SCREEN**
- Observe, identify and report; only fight in self-protection.

**SECURE**
- To gain possession of a posn or terrain, with or without force, and to make such disposns as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by en action.

**SEIZE**
- To gain possession of a posn or terrain with or without force.

**STRIKE**
- Inflict damage on, seize or destroy an objective.

**SUPPRESS**
- Fire to inhibit the en’s ability to acquire and attk friendly targets.

**SUSTAIN**
- Maint the nec level of combat power for the duration required to achieve objectives.

**WITHDRAW**
- Disengage from the en when in contact with the en (taken from ‘withdrawal ops’).

#### NON KINETIC/SOFT EFFECTS

**COERCED**

**DEGRADE**

**DELIVER**

**DENY**

**DISLOCATE**

**DESTABILIZE**

**DISRUPT**

**ESCORT**

**INFORM**

**ISOLATE**

**INFLUENCE**

**MANIPULATE**

**ORGANIZE**

**OVERTHROW**

**PERMITE**

**PERSUADE**

**PROTECT**

**REASSURE**

**REDUCE**

**SECURE**

**STABILIZE**

**UNDERMINE**

Non kinetic effects have yet to be defined in UK/GH doctrine, this provides some useful descriptions of some non lethal effects. Clearly the Comd would have to articulate exactly what he meant by each effect.
Q4 - Annex
The following pages show the build of overlays required to begin the draft DSO. They start with:

- The BAE (and in this case a TAI stipulated by the Bde DSO).
Next is the Most Likely Enemy COA.
LOCATE NAIs/TAIs

The staff then decide where best to confirm/deny the en COAs and where best to attack the enemy.
The Comd’s Effects Schematic must repeatedly be applied to the DSO trace to ensure that the development of the NAIs and the TAI\$s complies with his intent.
The picture above shows an extract of the Draft DSO, and concentrates on the ME Effect. It shows the initial thoughts of the Comd as to where the effect is to be had.

The TAI indicates where the staff using their planning tools and collaborative work believe the effect is *best* achieved.
This is another example of a COA board but with room only to detail one COA.
The DSOM is a resourcing tool. The above picture shows how the process works. Note the linkages to CCIR and the indicators (SIR) in the end column.
Q6 - Annex
Decision points need to be confirmed at this stage, and these will be further refined during wargaming. Decision points are required to allow the timely employment and synchronization of forces.

DPs can be either event or time related, normally the former.
This DSM was used by a BG CO to orchestrate his BG plan. It depicts the BG DPs in the bottom half of the sheet with the NAIs/TAlS effecting those key decisions in the top half of the sheet.
Q7 - Annex
This picture shows how the planning process is pulled together to produce the operational graphics.

Note. NAIs are designated as reconnaissance objectives; TAI as Engagement Areas. Note also that control measures are identified, for example boundaries, No Fire Areas (NFAs).

Finally, note that the Planning Lines which have been identified have a clearly identifiable purpose.
The final page of this booklet can act as a checklist to the BG staff on the output that might be produced for each question if the process is being completed fully and if time allows.

The above graphic highlights the output or products that can result from the staffwork in each of the 7 questions.